" This, of course, is proof positive that the Colombian dictator
had used his Congress as a mere shield, and a sham shield at that, and
it shows how utterly useless it would have been further to trust his
good faith in the matter.
When, in August, 1903, I became convinced that Colombia intended to
repudiate the treaty made the preceding January, under cover of securing
its rejection by the Colombian Legislature, I began carefully to
consider what should be done. By my direction, Secretary Hay, personally
and through the Minister at Bogota, repeatedly warned Colombia that
grave consequences might follow her rejection of the treaty. The
possibility of ratification did not wholly pass away until the close of
the session of the Colombian Congress on the last day of October. There
would then be two possibilities. One was that Panama would remain quiet.
In that case I was prepared to recommend to Congress that we should at
once occupy the Isthmus anyhow, and proceed to dig the canal; and I
had drawn out a draft of my message to this effect.[*] But from the
information I received, I deemed it likely that there would be a
revolution in Panama as soon as the Colombian Congress adjourned without
ratifying the treaty, for the entire population of Panama felt that
the immediate building of the canal was of vital concern to their
well-being.
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