In this juncture the administration
endeavored to persuade the South American republics to suspend their
expedition, and made overtures for Russian influence to induce Spain
to recognize the revolted republics and thus avoid the danger of
loss of her remaining possessions.
Adams sent a special message to the Senate (December 26, 1825),
nominating two delegates to the Panama Congress. He attempted to
disarm the gathering opposition by declaring that, although the
commissioning of these delegates was regarded as within the rights
of the executive, he desired the advice and consent of the Senate
and the House of Representatives to the proposed mission. Among the
topics named by Adams as suitable for discussion at the congress
were the principles of maritime neutrality, and "an agreement
between all of the parties represented at the meeting that each will
guard by its own means against the establishment of any future
European colony within its borders." This was a striking
qualification of a portion of the Monroe Doctrine, and it indicates
the anxiety of the executive not to commit the United States to any
permanent defensive alliance of the American republics.
Pages:
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405