Ever since the establishment of our first autonomous group of fighting
airplanes, which figured in the Artois offensives in May, 1915, but
which did not take the offensive (having their cantonments in the
barriers and limiting themselves to keeping off the enemy and cruising
above our lines and often behind them), our fighting airplanes gradually
overcame prejudice. They were not, it is true, so promptly brought to
perfection as our army corps airplanes, which proved so useful in the
Champagne campaign of September, 1915; but it was admitted that the
aerial combat should not be regarded as a result of mere chance, but as
inevitable, and that it constituted, first, a protection, and
afterwards an effective obstruction to an enemy forbidden to make raids
in our aerial domain. The next German offensive--against Verdun--had
been foreseen. In consequence, the staff had organized a safety service
to avoid all surprise by the enemy, to meet attacks, and prepare the way
for the reinforcing troops. But the violence of the Verdun offensive
exceeded all expectations.
Our escadrilles had done their duty as scouts before the attack.
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