But there is
also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the
idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with
us, nor we with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and
we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?
Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.
And will not knowledge-I mean absolute knowledge-answer to
absolute truth?
Certainly.
And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of
absolute being?
Yes.
But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we
have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a
knowledge of each kind of being which we have?
Certainly.
But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot
have?
No, we cannot.
And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the
absolute idea of knowledge?
Yes.
And we have not got the idea of knowledge?
No.
Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share
in absolute knowledge?
I suppose not.
Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in
itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely,
are unknown to us?
It would seem so.
I think that there is a stranger consequence still.
What is it?
Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there
is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our
knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest?
Yes.
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