Certainly not.
And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have
parts, and then one part may be in, and another part out of that
other; but that which has no parts can never be at one and the same
time neither wholly within nor wholly without anything.
True.
And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has
no parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it
cannot come into being either as a part or as a whole?
Clearly.
Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, not
by going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by
change in itself?
Very true.
Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?
Immoveable.
But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm.
Yes, we said so.
Then it is never in the same?
Why not?
Because if it were in the same it would be in something.
Certainly.
And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in
other?
True.
Then one is never in the same place?
It would seem not.
But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?
Never.
One then, as would seem, is neither rest nor in motion?
It certainly appears so.
Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other
than itself or other.
How is that?
If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be
one.
True.
And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not
itself; so that upon this supposition too, it would not have the
nature of one, but would be other than one?
It would.
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