So that the other is not the same either with the one or with being?
Certainly not.
And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and
the one, or the one and the other, in every such case we take two
things, which may be rightly called both.
How so.
In this way-you may speak of being?
Yes.
And also of one?
Yes.
Then now we have spoken of either of them?
Yes.
Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?
Certainly.
And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the
other-in any such case do I not speak of both?
Yes.
And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
Undoubtedly.
And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?
It cannot.
Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must
be severally one?
Clearly.
And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any
pair, the whole becomes three?
Yes.
And three are odd, and two are even?
Of course.
And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are
three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and
thrice one three?
Certainly.
There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and
there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be
thrice three?
Of course.
If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are
two and thrice, there is thrice two?
Undoubtedly.
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