And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and
perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception
of it?
Quite right.
Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and
expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other:
things appertains to the one.
Certainly, that is true.
Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is
both one and many, as we have described, and is, neither one nor many,
and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at
times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not
partake of being?
Certainly.
But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not
partake of being when partaking of being?
Impossible.
Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different
times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not
partake of the same.
True.
And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and
relinquishes being-for how can it have and not have the same thing
unless it receives and also gives it up at; some time?
Impossible.
And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?
I should.
And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?
I should.
The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking
and giving up being.
Certainly.
And being one and many and in process of becoming and being
destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it
ceases to be one?
Certainly.
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