True.
Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely
deprived of the one?
True.
Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness
and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in
them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them
opposite to one another.
That is clear.
But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things
was held by us to be impossible?
Impossible.
Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they
were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures,
which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake
of opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to
be impossible.
True.
Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor
at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor
greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything
else of the sort; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such
affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and
even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate,
seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.
Very true.
Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both
in relation to itself and to other things.
Certainly.
Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence
if the one is not?
Yes; we ought.
Pages:
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68