Clearly so.
Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of
relation to "that," and "this," and "these," and the like, and is an
attribute of "this"; for the one, or the others than the one, could
not have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the
one that is not have been or been spoken of, nor could it have been
said to be anything, if it did not partake of "some," or of the
other relations just now mentioned.
True.
Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the
one that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it
and nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that
is not is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a
different nature, we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that
the one that is not and nothing else is not, then it must
participate in the predicate "that," and in many others.
Certainly.
And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the
others being different from the one will be of a different kind.
Certainly.
And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?
Of course.
And are not things other in kind unlike?
They are unlike.
And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will
clearly be unlike them?
Clearly so.
Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are
unlike it?
That would seem to be true.
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